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ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: WEDDING GIFT EXCHANGE
AND ASSET PRICING UNDER RISK
Shijun Ju, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This thesis contributes to economic research in two subfields of behavioral economics: asset
pricing under risk and gift-exchange.
The first essay, “Risk, Information and Asset Pricing: An Experiment,” investigates
how providing non-fundamental information in experimental asset market affects market
pricing process. The information points to potential arbitrage opportunity in the market if
market prices are different from the intrinsic values, which is expected to speed up market
price convergence to intrinsic values. In contrast, persistent underpricing is observed in all
experimental sessions. Providing non-fundamental information introduces price rigidity that
disrupts the information diffusion process. As a result, share prices are anchored around
levels that reflect different market appetite towards risk in different experimental sessions.
The second essay, “Giving According to The Rules: A Study of Monetary Gift Exchange
in China,” explores the features of the social institution of monetary gift exchange for Chinese
weddings using a survey study. Results show that the size of giving depends on the nature
and quality of relationship, and gift history. The size of gift as a proportion of average social
disposable income tends to decrease over time, which implies that monetary gift exchange
does not intensify the status competition. Monetary gift exchange also tends to maintain the
balance of giving as the size of return gifts as a proportion of average city-wise disposable
income is often similar to the size of initial gifts received in the past.
Keywords: behavioral economics, risk, information, asset pricing, experiment; monetary
gift exchange, reciprocity, social norms, status competition.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, behavioral economics has captured the interest and imagination
of economic researchers. Insight about human behavior from behavioral economics, e.g.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman and Tversky (1981), Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Loewenstein et al. (2001), Rabin (1993)..., has improved our understanding of many perceived
social “irregularities” such as economic decision making under risk and uncertainty, asset mis-
pricing from fundamentals, other-regarding behavior and the coexistence of market economy
and gift economy.
This thesis aims to contribute to these literatures by studying the impact of information
on asset pricing under bankruptcy risk in a laboratory experiment and the social norms
governing the institution of monetary gift exchange in urban China using a survey study.
Chapter 2 investigates how providing more information in an experimental asset market
affects the outcomes of market pricing process. The experiment introduces uncertainty on
asset quality to investigate market pricing decisions facing bankruptcy risk. I use non-
fundamental information, which reveals asset mis-pricing from its fundamental values, to
induce arbitrage in order to reduce price divergence from asset intrinsic value and improve
the accuracy of market belief adjustments. On the contrary, providing the information
actually reduces price fluctuations even when there is significant scope for arbitrage profits.
As a result, prices become sticky in informed markets as they tend to oscillate closely around
a fixed level for extended periods. This result is not affected by experience as each session
contains at least ten repetitions of similar market conditions.
Chapter 3 analyzes the features of the institution of monetary gift exchange for Chinese
weddings in order to understand how social status competition in China discovered in recent
empirical research (Brown et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2011)) affects monetary giving decisions.
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Through a survey study, I utilize private gift records kept by urban Chinese households
to understand the dynamics of monetary gift exchange. Results show that the size of giving
depends on the nature and quality of relationship, and gift history. Relatives are more
generous towards each other while the effect is stronger for kinship of better relation quality.
Though the size of CPI adjusted monetary gifts increases over time, it rises slower than the
average city-wide disposable income. Thus the size of gifts as a proportion of social average
disposable income is declining over time, which suggests that social status competition has
limited impact on the size of monetary gifts. Further, within an existing relationship, past
gift transactions influence future gift decisions. Return gifts tend to add a premium compared
with the size of initial gifts though the size of premium is declining as initial gifts become
larger.
2
2.0 RISK, INFORMATION AND ASSET PRICING: AN EXPERIMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Since Vernon Smith, Gerry Suchanek and Arlington Williams (1988) first published the
results of phenomenal rise and burst of bubbles in experimental asset markets, a large lit-
erature followed attempting to understand the origins of bubbles and crashes in financial
markets. In contrast, less attention is paid to understanding the aftermath of the burst of
financial bubbles, i.e. the distressed market conditions. After all, it is the self-fulfilling crises
of confidence and the potentially prolonged recession that governments fear the most.
In this project, I attempt to explore the role of non-fundamental information on mar-
ket pricing decisions for indefinitely lived assets (i.e. with bankruptcy risk). Fundamental
information directly affects an asset’s ability to generate value for an owner, e.g. the total
profits that is expected to generate if one holds the asset to the liquidation. In contrast,
non-fundamental information reveals other information that has no influence on an asset’s
intrinsic worth. For example, an asset’s price history shows an asset’s value generating ability
in the past but may has no value for evaluating current and future intrinsic values.
Non-fundamental information may be derived from existing fundamental information but
has no impact on an asset’s intrinsic value. For instance, when a private firm hires financial
analysts to estimate its worth in order to set an IPO price, the estimated value reveals the
firm’s worth; however, the intrinsic value is solely determined by the firm’s profit generating
ability rather than the estimated value. Similarly, a PLC may plan a share buy-back when
the listed price is lower than its own estimated value for the firm. Thus, the non-fundamental
information only provides guidance on the extent of market mis-pricing rather than affecting
the firm’s worth.
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It is often difficult to distinguish fundamental and non-fundamental information in the
field. In practice, fundamental information such as published accounting reports and div-
idend announcement often contains too much noise (e.g. manipulation from management,
time lag on incorporating new information) to accurately reflect a firm’s true value. So esti-
mating a firm’s intrinsic value is subject to analysts’ ability to filter noise. A good analyst
is able to correctly select and generate quality information that adds informative signal of
intrinsic value to her report.
There is also information that may or may not contain fundamental information in
the market. For instance, rumors of a potential merger could reflect true insider leaking
(fundamental) or false information (non-fundamental and worthless).
Due to these difficulties of separating fundamental and non-fundamental information in
the field, I use controlled experiment in order to evaluate the influence of information of
different natures. I tackle the question of the effect of non-fundamental information on asset
(mis-)pricing using experimental asset markets. The environment is comparable to market
conditions where there is risk and uncertainty on the future of a publicly listed firm.
Related literature. A large literature in economics has been devoted to studying the
ability of market to reflect an asset’s intrinsic value. Economists are often concerned with
what drives asset prices away from their intrinsic values.
One line of research focuses on verifying the validity of the rational expectations hy-
pothesis advanced in the seminal works of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972). According to the
rational expectations hypothesis, the market system aggregates all relevant information to
generate a market price that is consistent with the intrinsic value of an asset.
Asset experiments initiated by Forsythe et al. (1982) document that when there is no
uncertainty on the value of an asset (i.e. publicly known dividend income in each period),
asset prices converge over time toward the rational expectations prices. Another stylized fact
of these experiments is that price convergence often happens from below, which reflects the
caution shown by market participants in early stages of experimental sessions. Moreover, the
convergence to the intrinsic value is not guaranteed when assets contain uncertain bankruptcy
risk, i.e. the uncertainty on when the assets cease to exist with redemption value of zero.
Camerer and Weigelt (1993) show that persistent divergence from intrinsic value can exist
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when stochastic bankruptcy risk (a 1/8 chance of assets becoming worthless after each period)
is introduced. With bankruptcy risk, the price divergence also tends to last longer, sometimes
persisting to the end of session.
The elimination of price divergence depends on the existence of smart traders who are
able to recognize the price discrepancy from the intrinsic value, to engage in arbitrage by
taking on the bankruptcy risk. This finding provides a first glimpse of the importance of risk
appetite (the willingness to take risk) composition on price convergence. Similarly, Crokett
and Duffy (2013) report that more risk tolerant players (as identified through the Holt-Laury
paired lottery choice task) typically hold more risky assets.
So what motivates these smart traders to take on risk in exchange for potential arbitrage
profits? In the experiment reported in this paper, I use non-fundamental public informa-
tion to reveal arbitrage opportunities in order to study its impact on price convergence.
Haruvy et al. (2007) tested the effect of providing non-fundamental information in a bubble
experiment: though the availability of information couldn’t stop the formation of bubbles
in inexperienced markets, the bubbles were eliminated as players gained more experience.
By contrast in our experiment, the mis-pricing lasts to the end of session during which
participants experience more than nine repetitions of similar markets.
Asset pricing experiments on information mainly focus on the question of markets’ ability
to successfully aggregate private fundamental information in asset markets (initiated by Plott
and Sunder (1982), [1988] and reviewed in Sunder (1995)). In contrast, the experiment
discussed in this paper focuses on the public non-fundamental information.
Another line of the literature initiated by Smith et al. (1988) focuses on the factors
that create financial bubbles. Palan (2013) provides a comprehensive review of these bubble
experiments which often find that when trading assets that generate i.i.d. dividend streams,
investors were more likely to speculate about price movements which often produced the rise
and burst of speculative bubbles. However, as Palfrey and Wang (2013) point out,
“In early periods, transaction prices are significantly below the equilibrium price ... Because
the equilibrium price declines over time while the price adjustment process drives the below-
equilibrium prices upward, the transaction prices eventually catch up with equilibrium prices
... the equilibrium price continues to fall ... results in a situation where prices exceed
fundamental value-a bubble.”
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In fact, Noussair et al. (2001) find that the probability of forming bubbles is reduced with
constant fundamental values and less frequent dividend payments. Moreover, Haruvy et al.
(2007) discover that traders tend to have adaptive beliefs which are “based on past trends
in the current and previous markets in which they have participated.” Thus it seems that
the sensitivity of belief adjustments to new information is the key factor underlying different
price dynamics in asset markets. An alternative explanation put forth by Palfrey and Wang
(2013) attributes speculation to traders’ heterogeneous beliefs after observing common public
signals. Thus, optimistic players hold more assets to support the market prices in the hope
of selling in the future to more optimistic players. In contrast to the present paper, these
papers are mainly interested in the causes of bubbles and speculation, while my approach
focuses on the effect of information and risk on mis-pricing.
In finance, the existence of volatility clustering, as when ”large price changes tend to
be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be followed by small
changes” (Mandelbrot (1963)), has led to the use of GARCH models in financial forecasting
and derivative pricing. The seminal works of the ARCH (Engle (1982)) and GARCH (Boller-
slev (1986)) models aim to more accurately capture the phenomenon of volatility clustering
and related effects such as kurtosis (i.e. fat tails), which are critical to financial pricing and
risk management analysis.
Owing to the time constraints on lab experiments, there are limited experimental works
studying volatility clustering. Using experimental asset markets with asymmetric funda-
mental information, Huber and Kirchler (2007) observe a significantly positive relationship
between the degree of heterogeneity in fundamental information and absolute returns, and an
intra-periodical pattern where absolute returns decrease after the arrival of new asymmetric
fundamental information.
The design of the experiment reported in this paper is different from Huber and Kirchler
(2007) in terms of the nature of information. In my experiment, the fundamental information
(i.e. the dividend announcement) is public to all participants. The information available in
the more informed treatment only serves to assist players’ evaluation and investment process
but has no influence on an asset’s intrinsic value. If the rational expectations hypothesis
holds, the non-fundamental information provided in our experiment would have no impact
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on pricing decisions.
Surprisingly, results show that the availability of non-fundamental information actually
reduces market price adjustments (in terms of price movements and estimated belief adjust-
ments) both within and across periods perhaps due to the reduced heterogeneity of beliefs
among market participants Palfrey and Wang (2013).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the experimental design and main
hypotheses, Section 2.3 analyzes a simple model of asset pricing under risky environment
and the model calibrations in our paper. Section 2.4 summarizes the main findings of the
study. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The experiment was conducted using Fischbacher (2007) z-Tree software over networked
computers in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory. A total of 60 subjects in
six experimental sessions (three sessions for each of two treatments) were recruited from the
student populations of the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University.
Each session hires 9 to 11 subjects with no prior participation in asset market experiment
for two and half hours. A session began with the distribution of written instructions that
were then read aloud to all subjects. A brief comprehension quiz was administered, subjects
played two trial periods of the experiment and then completed between 40 to 48 paid periods
in a session. The experiment currency is francs with 600 francs exchanged for 1 US dollar
at the end of session.
In each session, “period” represents the basic time unit. The periods in a session are
divided into distinct sequences that are divided by initiating and bankruptcy of a company.
In each sequence, there is only one way to invest a player’s wealth: holding or purchasing
shares of a company. There is uncertainty on the profit generating ability (i.e. quality)
of the company and risk on the number of periods that the company would last before
going bankrupt. The company distributes dividend in each period whose size is an imperfect
signal for the underlying company quality. Thus a sequence resembles real life scenario where
7
Table 1: Features of Shares
investors are uncertain of a listed company’s ability to generate periodic profits and when it
may go bankrupt and get liquidated. The quality of the company in a sequence is either A
or B.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the shares of a company of Quality A and B.
Both types of share can generate either a HIGH (150 francs) or LOW (0) periodic dividend
that is determined by a random draw at the end of each period. But Share A is twice likely
to generate a HIGH dividend per period as Share B. No player knows the underlying quality
of shares traded until the sequence ends.
Figure 1 illustrates how the share type and the dividend are determined in a sequence
and a period, respectively. Each sequence starts with a 50/50 random draw to determine the
type of shares traded in the sequence. The chosen type dictates the dividend distribution
of shares in all periods of the sequence. Though the chosen share type remains hidden to
all players, players can use the history of announced dividends to update their beliefs of the
hidden share type. A dividend is randomly determined by the central system at the end of
each period based on the selected share type in the sequence. At the end of each period,
there is a random chance of 1/4 that current sequence ends and all shares become worthless,
then another sequence begins with a new draw of share type; otherwise, current sequence
continues for another period. Given this exogenous probability of the ending of sequence,
each sequence is expected last four periods, thus the intrinsic values (the expected total
francs generated if a share is held to the end of a sequence) are 400 and 200 for Share A and
Share B, respectively.
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Figure 1: Types of Share in a Sequence and Sizes of Dividend in a Period
Nature
Share A Share B
Nature Nature
Low
Dividend
0
High
Dividend
150
Low
Dividend
0
High
Dividend
150
1/2 1/2
Period 1,... Period 1,...
2/3 1/3 1/3 2/3
SEQUENCE
PERIOD
Figure 2 summarizes the time-line of events in a session. Each period in a sequence
has three stages: information, trading, and outcome. The two treatments differ only at the
information stage (Appendix A.1 Figure 12): players in less informed sessions (the Control)
only have access to the dividend history of the current sequence; by contrast, in informed
sessions (the Treatment), players are provided with additional information including current
intrinsic value estimated according Bayes’ rule using dividend history, a summary of current
sequence (i.e. history of dividends, Bayesian intrinsic values, average trading prices), and a
summary of all completed sequences (i.e. the average total dividend income generated by a
share in all sequences, average cost per share in all sequences). The additional information
in the informed sessions can help potentially smart players to determine whether shares are
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Figure 2: Timing of Events
Overall Period t t+1
−
Sequence Sn Begins
−
Period 1 of Sn begins
−
Period 1 of Sn ends
Information (20s) Trading (60s) Outcome
Random draw
of share type
Prob(A)=Prob(B)=0.5
chosen type unknown
to all players
till sequence ends
Read informationTrade shares
in double auction
mechanism
Random draw
of dividend
based on
hidden share type
Continue to Period 2
with prob 3/4
else new sequence
n+1 begins
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properly valued relative to the intrinsic value. For instance, current market price above
(below) a share’s intrinsic value implies that shares are over-priced (under-priced) and any
difference is the potential arbitrage profits for less risk averse players; similarly, in the sum-
mary of completed sequence, the difference between the average value generated by a share
and the average cost of a share indicates the extent of mis-pricing in the market.
At trading stage (Appendix A.1 Figure 13), players trade assets in a double-auction
environment for one minute. Each trader has an initial endowment of 4 shares and 2,400
francs in each sequence. All dividend income can be used for trading but no short selling is
allowed, thus the downside arbitrage is not possible. There is also a bankruptcy constraint
that does not allow any trader to engage in a transaction that would result in her cash
holdings to go below zero. All prices are in integer values and are bounded between 1 and
999 francs.
The outcome stage (Appendix A.1 Figure 14) reveals the size of dividend for the current
period. In addition, the system notifies players whether current sequence ends (a 1/4 chance)
or proceeds to another period. If the current sequence ends, the hidden share type is revealed;
shares have no redemption value, thus the ending of a sequence resembles a scenario of
liquidation.
In a experimental session, each subject is recruited for a two and half hour block of time.
I informed them they would participate in one or more sequences, each of which consists of
an indefinite number of trading periods for at least one hour after the instructions had been
read and all questions answered. After a sequence ends, if less than 60 minutes have passed
since the start of the first sequence, a new sequence will begin just like the first sequence. If
more than 60 minutes have elapsed since the beginning of the first sequence then the current
sequence will be the last sequence played. In order to increase the comparability between
sessions, the sequence length and the chosen share type in each sequence are predetermined
for each session but the actual dividends are randomly determined based on underlying asset
types.
At the end of each session, subjects were paid in cash for three randomly selected se-
quences of the trading task (and a forecasting task1). All sessions lasted two hours or less
1The forecast task asks subjects to predict the average trading price in the trading stage of the period,
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and the average earnings were approximately $27.24, including a $6.00 participation fee.
Since the experiment is designed specifically to evaluate the impact of non-fundamental
information on market pricing decisions and price divergence from intrinsic values, the first
hypothesis concerns the level of convergence to the intrinsic values.
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the presence of non-fundamental information that reveals market
mis-pricing, prices in informed sessions track intrinsic values more closely than less
informed sessions.
The second conjecture focuses on market reactions after a dividend announcement. Since
dividend announcements are correlated with the underlying share type, a more informed
market is expected to price in the information more effectively than less informed markets.
Thus the second hypothesis compares derived market belief adjustments. Note, since tracking
intrinsic values requires both correct belief adjustments and the market being risk neutral,
the second hypothesis is weaker because it only requires better belief adjustments in more
informed market.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The belief adjustments in more informed sessions are closer to Bayesian
belief adjustments.
2.3 ASSET PRICING IN RISKY ENVIRONMENT AND MODEL
CALIBRATIONS
In this section I describe an asset pricing framework in a risky environment induced by risky
dividend payments and indefinite trading horizon, then I discuss the calibration method used
in our data analysis to test the hypotheses.
As shown in Appendix A.2, based on the parameters used in the experiment, the risk
neutral expected values of a share of quality A and B are 400 and 200 francs, respectively.
Thus the ex ante intrinsic value of a share is 300 francs at the beginning of each sequence.
We use a discount factor δ, which strictly decreases with the measure of risk attitude in
with an earning between 0 and 30 francs for each prediction.
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exponential utility function (Appendix A.2), applied to the intrinsic value 300 to measure
the risk appetite in a market: P1 = 300δ, i.e. more risk averse (loving) market would
have first period market prices (P1) that are more heavily discounted (over-priced) from the
intrinsic value. Thus we can use the market price in the first period of each sequence to
derive the risk appetite for the sequence:
δ =
P1
300
(2.1)
δ =
P1
300
(2.2)
Then assuming that the risk appetite remains stable in a sequence, the market valuation
for a share of unknown quality is a function of the level of risk appetite and market beliefs
on the underlying share quality being A:
Pt = 200δ(1 + ρt), t ≥ 1 (2.3)
where ρt is the market belief in period t of a sequence for the underlying share type being
A.
Given the estimated risk appetite δ from first period price, we can estimate the subjective
market beliefs and belief adjustments for later periods (t ≥ 2) by rearranging Eq. (2.3):
ρt =
Pt
200δ
− 1, t ≥ 2 (2.4)
4ρt = 4Pt
200δ
, t ≥ 2 (2.5)
where 4ρt is the estimated belief adjustment from period t - 1 to period t.
The analysis of market belief adjustment using Eq. (2.4)-(2.5) reveals the state and evo-
lution of market beliefs. The market reactions to dividend announcement can be categorized
into four groups: optimism, pessimism, caution, and exuberance and panic.
An optimistic (pessimistic) market would react more (less) than the Bayesian belief
adjustment after a positive dividend announcement and less (more) than the Bayesian belief
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adjustment after a negative dividend announcement, i.e. 4ρt > 4prob(A)Bayesiant (4ρt <
4prob(A)Bayesiant ).
Alternatively, a market could show caution, which exhibits price stickiness or under-
reaction to news (i.e. 4ρt4prob(A)Bayesiant
< 1), or exuberance and panic, which is associated with
price over-reaction to news (i.e. 4ρt4prob(A)Bayesiant
> 1).
The design of our experiment also offers the opportunity to evaluate the impact of ex-
perience on market sentiment in terms of evolution of risk appetite in a session. While the
assumption of stationarity suggests constant and stable risk appetite between repetitions of
markets, the experience accumulated in previous markets could affect market participants’
pricing decisions in the future. Thus by using Eq. (2.2) to estimate risk appetite in the first
period of each sequence, we investigate how risk appetite evolves with the accumulation of
experience.
Last, in addition to study market-level price adjustment (using the median price in a
period), we also investigate the impact of information on the volatility of price within a
period by comparing the standard deviation of prices (of completed trades) in each period.
2.4 EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
2.4.1 Under-pricing Relative to the Intrinsic Values
Finding 1: Market prices are lower than suggested by the risk neutral Bayesian model;
risk aversion contributes to the under-pricing in all sessions; market beliefs have mixed
impact on under-pricing in less informed markets while continued caution (i.e. insensi-
tive reactions to fundamental news) contributes to the continued under-pricing in more
informed markets. The price divergence does not decrease with experience.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of intrinsic values, market prices and price discount (i.e.
intrinsic price - market price) in each session with the asterisks indicating the beginning
of a sequence. In all sessions, market prices are significantly lower than the intrinsic values
(Paired-Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test p-value < 0.01 ), which shows persistent price
14
Figure 3: Intrinsic Values, Median Market Prices and Price Discounts
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discounting at the presence of bankruptcy risk.
As shown in Eq. (2.3) of previous section, two factors contribute to the mis-pricing: risk
appetite and belief adjustments. First, we investigate the impact of risk appetite on price
divergence. Since the risk neutral valuation in the first period of each sequence is always
300, the effect of risk appetite can be identified by comparing first period prices with 300.
As almost all 2 first period prices are below the risk neutral valuation 300 in Figure 3, one
reason for the under-pricing is the persistent risk aversion in all sessions.
Figure 4 compares the derived market beliefs (the circles) using Eq. (2.4) with the
Bayesian beliefs (the asterisks). In the Control (less informed) treatment, the market of
Session 1 believes that the underlying share type is more likely of low quality (Paired-Sample
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test p-value < 0.01 ). In contrast, the sentiment in Session 2 is the
opposite to in Session 1 with consistent beliefs of being Share A (p-value < 0.01 ). Lastly,
there is no clear bias in Session 3.
For the informed treatment, all three sessions exhibit negative sentiment towards the
quality of the underlying company/shares (p-value = 0.045 for Session 4, p-value < 0.01 for
Session 5 and 6).
Another important feature shown in Figure 4 is that, the market belief adjustments are
less reactive to fundamental news than implied in the Bayesian model as all sessions have
less than unit slope for the linear regression between the derived beliefs and Bayesian beliefs.
Further, we find no significant difference between belief adjustments after a positive funda-
mental news or a negative fundamental news. Thus market participants exercise significant
caution to fundamental news announcements, which is further confirmed by the regression
analysis in later sections.
Since our findings are essentially the reverse of the results of bubble experiments without
the burst of negative bubbles, we also test the impact of experience on price convergence. In
bubble experiments, the over-pricing disappears and prices track the intrinsic values after the
second or more repetitions of the same markets. By contrast, after dividing each session into
two halves at just above period 20, we find that divergence doesn’t decrease with experience
for either treatment at any statistically significance level.
2The only exception is the first period in the first sequence of Control-Session 1.
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Figure 4: Derived Market Beliefs and Bayesian Beliefs
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Figure 5: Price Volatility Between Periods
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2.4.2 Price Divergence for Informed and Less Informed Markets
Finding 2: There is no significant difference between the price divergence from the intrinsic
values in informed and less informed sessions. Prices are more volatile in less informed
sessions in which prices oscillate around fixed levels.
After pooling all price deviations based on treatment, there is no significant difference of
the price deviations between the two treatments (Welch Two Sample t-test: p-value = 0.78 ).
However, as shown in Figure 3, sessions tend to show different price dynamics. Moreover,
price actions in less informed sessions are more volatile while prices in informed sessions
appear to oscillate closely around price levels that are specific to each session.
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of prices in each session. While prices in less informed
sessions fluctuate in wide ranges, market valuations in more informed sessions are anchored at
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opposing extremes. Among pair-wise session comparisons, prices in informed Sessions 4 and
5 are significantly higher than in all less informed sessions (Welch Two Sample t-test p-value
< 0.01 ) while prices in informed Session 6 are significantly lower than in all less informed
sessions (p-value < 0.01 ); furthermore, price activities in all three informed sessions are
less volatile than in all less informed sessions (F-test p-value < 0.01 ). Thus providing non-
fundamental information reduces price movements rather than improving price convergence.
Because subjects interacted repeatedly with randomly determined dividend sequences
in each session, market pricing decisions in each period cannot be treated as independent
observations. To account for this, the rest of the analysis below uses panel data regression
with standard errors clustered at the session level to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
2.4.3 Stability of Risk Appetite between Treatments
Finding 3: Markets exhibit different levels of risk appetite between sessions. The risk
appetite is more stable in sessions with more non-fundamental information.
In Section 2.4.1, instead of assuming stationary risk appetite throughout entire sessions,
we derive market beliefs in each sequence based on estimated risk appetite for the sequence.
The reason, as we show in this section, is that the availability of non-fundamental information
affects how markets adjust the level of risk appetite during a session.
We focus on the dynamics of the derived risk appetite from the first period of each
sequence because the probability of being Share A is always 0.5 at the beginning of a sequence
while prices in later periods reflect the evolution of both risk appetite and market beliefs.
Figure 6 shows the dynamics of first period prices of each session while Table 2 sum-
marizes the evolution of these prices using a simple regression of prices on session dummies
and sequences. The results show that the markets become increasingly risk averse in less
informed Session 1 and 2 by dropping valuations of -6.7 and -16.1 francs per sequence, respec-
tively, while less informed Session 3 exhibits more optimism as first period prices increase
by 8.6 francs per sequence. By contrast, first period prices remain relatively stable in all
19
Figure 6: Market Prices in First Periods
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informed sessions with 4 and 6 exhibiting no trend and 5 showing a slight downtrend of -2.3
francs per sequence. In light of the instability of risk appetite, our later regression analysis
controls the level of risk appetite at sequence level to take account of the non-stationarity
when evaluating belief adjustments.
2.4.4 Beliefs and Under-Adjustment for Beliefs
In this section, we investigate the impact of information on belief adjustments. In order to
separate the belief adjustment and risk appetite adjustment, we implicitly assume that the
risk appetite remains constant through the sequence, and thus only re-measure the risk ap-
petite in the first period of each sequence. In addition, the way that risk appetite is measured
means that there is no need to introduce session dummies in our regression analysis. For in-
stance, as shown in Figure 6, in the informed sessions, the first period prices remain almost
constant, thus introducing a session dummy would only create multicollinearity problem
which prevents us from measuring the impact of risk appetite accurately.
Table 3 reports results of the OLS regression analysis for the derived belief adjustments
using Eq. (2.5).
Finding 4: Between periods, markets react to dividend announcements in expected direc-
tions but display significant caution which results in under-adjustment of belief. Overall,
providing more non-fundamental information makes markets less reactive to news.
This finding rejects Hypothesis 2 which predicts that providing more information
should have guided market belief adjustments closer to Bayesian adjustments than less in-
formed markets. The less informed markets significantly under-react to dividend news: only
22.1% to 31.3% of predicted by Bayesian belief updating. By contrast, the market reactions
from the informed markets (14.4%) are merely less than half of in less informed markets
(31.3%). This result confirms the observations in Figure 3 that prices in informed sessions
tend to oscillate closely around fixed price levels till the end of session.
Thus when markets are risk averse, the price searching process in less informed market
is more active than sessions provided with non-fundamental information. Providing non-
intrinsic information generates a type of price stickiness. The stickiness prevents markets
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Table 2: Stationarity of Market Prices in First Periods
Dependent Variable
Median Prices in First Periods
Sequence*D(Uninformed-S1) −6.706∗∗∗
(1.156)
Sequence*D(Uninformed-S2) −16.085∗∗∗
(1.522)
Sequence*D(Uninformed-S3) 8.585
∗∗∗
(1.522)
Sequence*D(Informed-S4) −0.738
(1.156)
Sequence*D(Informed-S5) −2.332∗∗
(1.156)
Sequence*D(Informed-S6) −1.439
(1.522)
D(Uninformed-S2) 81.926
∗∗∗
(12.713)
D(Uninformed-S3) −110.408∗∗∗
(12.713)
D(Informed-S4) 19.538
(12.034)
D(Informed-S5) 18.568
(12.034)
D(Informed-S6) −109.674
(12.713)
N 66
R2 0.942
∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 3: Price and Belief Adjustment to Dividend Announcement
Belief Adjustments
(1) (2) (3)
Information 0.028∗ −0.111∗ −0.114∗
(1 if More Informed) (0.016) (0.067) (0.067)
4ProbA,Bayesian 0.221∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.075)
Information∗4ProbA,Bayesian −0.169∗
(0.105)
Risk Appetite −0.140∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.071) (0.071)
Information*Risk Appetite 0.189∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.089) (0.089)
Constant 0.050 0.137∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 197 197 197
R2 0.145 0.164 0.175
∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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from large price drop after negative news but also reduces the upside of price movements
after good news, which results in market valuations trapped at a level for a long time. This
effect is most striking when comparing the price dynamics between less informed Session
2 and informed Session 6 in Figure 4.1. Both sessions begin at similar price levels below
200 francs. As sessions progress, prices in Session 2 move above 200 level for later periods
while prices in Session 6 gradually move downwards at -2.3 francs per sequence.
2.4.5 Additional Observation: Price Volatility
So far our analysis is restricted to the periodical median prices. This approach helps us filter
the noisy price rediscovery process within each period after each dividend announcement in
order to focus on price reactions between periods attributed to the new fundamental infor-
mation conveyed by latest dividend announcement. In this section, we investigate the impact
of non-fundamental information on price volatility in a period during the price rediscovery
process.
Finding 5: Providing more information decreases price volatility in a period after a dividend
announcement. The price stickiness introduces volatility clustering in both treatments.
Volatility clustering is stronger in informed markets.
Table 4 summarizes the results of OLS regression analysis for the dynamics of price
volatility. Providing more information reduces price volatility in a period, which implies
that in informed sessions, not only price movements between periods is low, the price ac-
tivity is also lowered within each period. By contrast, in less informed sessions, a dividend
announcement is followed by larger price movements in the next period, which generates
more potential for price searching to correct mis-pricing. Moreover, providing more infor-
mation also doubles volatility clustering from 0.241 to 0.497, thus a low volatility period is
more likely to be followed by another low volatility period.
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Table 4: Volatility Analysis
Dependent Variable
Volatility in Period t
Standard Deviation of Price (σt,P rice)
(1) (2)
Information −2.282∗∗∗ −5.253∗∗
(1 if More Informed) (0.986) (2.029)
Information*Lag1 Volatility 0.256∗
(0.153)
Lag1 Volatility 0.316∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.082)
Dividendt−1(1 if HIGH) −1.198 −1.185
(0.937) (0.932)
Risk Appetite −2.076 −0.885
(2.641) (2.723)
Period −0.186 −0.204
(0.309) (0.308)
Constant 12.535∗∗∗ 12.834∗∗∗
(2.722) (2.715)
Observations 198 198
R2 0.182 0.194
∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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2.4.6 Discussion
What can we learn from these findings, and how should we interpret them? The experimental
data presented in the paper exhibit three features in asset markets with indefinite horizon:
persistent risk aversion, under-reaction to fundamental information and longer memory for
prices in more informed markets with non-fundamental information.
Bankruptcy risk appears to be the main reason behind the persistence of risk aversion.
As discussed in the literature review, risk aversion in early periods tend to be a common
feature in asset market experiments, i.e. the convergence from below in rational expectations
experiments and “prices start out below fundamental value” in bubble experiments. One
explanation for the early under-pricing is the caution inexperienced participants show in
early stages of a market and the resulting thin liquidity in the market, which reduces the
effectiveness of the price searching functionality of markets. As market participants trade
more actively, the forces of demand and supply, which often react to the realization of an
asset’s fundamental value and experience, guide market valuation toward the intrinsic value.
However, when an asset has bankruptcy risk without redemption value, the risk of holding
an asset significantly increases. The bankruptcy risk generates a vacuum between any non-
zero market price and zero. This risk drives aways less risk tolerant investors and reduces
the incentive for active trading from speculators. As a result, the reduced market liquidity
and enthusiasm for speculation invalidate the functioning of price mechanism in searching
for and reflecting an asset’s intrinsic value. Thus in order for market prices to track the
intrinsic values, one of two conditions must be satisfied: powerful fundamental traders and/or
sufficient incentive for trading.
In a forecasting experiment reported in Hommes et al. (2005), price deviations from
intrinsic values are significantly reduced by using “robot” traders who arbitrage against the
deviation. Another significance of the “robot” traders is that no matter what the market
condition is, they always generate liquidity to push market price towards the intrinsic values.
Clearly, the “robot” traders resemble the role of central banks in stabilizing the market.
However, the effectiveness of fundamental players to reduce mis-pricing is often uncertain
because of the difficulty of accurately estimating an asset’s or a market’s intrinsic value in
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real life.
The other way to eliminate fundamental deviation is to introduce incentive to trade,
which accelerates the price searching process. The main method for this approach is to
introduce heterogeneous values for different market participants. Both Camerer and Weigelt
(1993) and Crokett and Duffy (2013) design experiments of indefinite duration in which
assets have different and switching values for different types of players. In their designs, the
value generated by an asset for each player rotates between high and low across periods:
in each period, a portion of players have low values while others have high values. This
structure generates incentive for players with high values in one period to buy shares from
low value players and then sell back in the next period. The effectiveness of this approach in
eliminating fundamental deviations is mixed, with price oscillating closely around intrinsic
values in some sessions while bubbles or persistent under-pricing observed in other sessions.
Another reason for the persistence of under-pricing is the market’s inability to fully digest
fundamental information or react to changes in intrinsic value. The inability to incorporate
new information results in an anchoring effect that slows down the market revaluation pro-
cess toward new fundamentals. Palan (2013) summarizes that “subjects’ price forecasts are
biased and serially correlated,” thus traders’ forecasts for future price heavily rely on cur-
rent and past prices. Two recent papers (Huber et al. (2015) and Baghestanian and Walker
(2015)) confirm the existence of this anchoring effect in asset markets without bankruptcy
risk. Huber et al. (2015) find efficient pricing in markets with constant fundamental values;
however, the sticky prices fail to follow declining fundamental value, which generates the rise
and burst of bubbles; similarly, market prices could not rise fast enough to catch increasing
fundamental values, which results in under-valuation.
Baghestanian and Walker (2015) adopt a novel approach to explicitly test the influence of
this anchoring effect. For assets of constant intrinsic value, adding a visual aid on price charts
at an asset’s intrinsic value can reliably eliminate mis-pricing; by contrast, the anchoring
effect of visual aids at randomly selected non-fundamental value disappears as players acquire
more experience. Thus anchoring at fundamental values can potentially remove mis-pricing.
The anchoring at intrinsic value is certainly attractive if the asset’s intrinsic value is
constant across periods. However, this is unlikely in real world where market prices contin-
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uously fluctuate to search for the evolving intrinsic value of a(n) asset/company. In fact, as
shown in the seminal paper Smith (1962), the main benefit of the free market is its ability to
automatically search for the competitive equilibrium price. Thus the anchoring effect could
introduces significant price divergence from fundamentals if an asset’s intrinsic value changes
frequently.
Anchoring effect is attractive only if the intrinsic value is relatively stable and prices
often drift away from fundamentals when without proper anchors. Under these conditions, for
example, at the presence of bankruptcy risk as in our experiment, providing non-fundamental
information can anchor prices close to the intrinsic value and strengthen the anchoring effect
with reduced price movements.
The benefit is clearly not guaranteed as observed in Session 6. In Session 6, market prices
started significantly below the intrinsic value, and were trapped at the low level to the end
of session as a result of the reduced market reactions to fundamental news. Thus a natural
question for future research is to how to use information to induce market to choose desired
anchor near the intrinsic value.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I test the effectiveness of providing non-fundamental information in eliminating
asset mis-pricing in experimental asset markets. By making arbitrage opportunities more
salient, we predict that the information would reduce price divergence and improve belief
adjustment process. On the contrary, the results show that the availability of information
generates price stickiness so that price movements are significantly reduced. On the positive
side, there are informed sessions where the anchored prices stay close to the ex ante intrinsic
value; however, it is also possible that prices remain significantly below intrinsic values for
extended periods. In addition, this effect does not decrease with experience.
One limitation of our study is that we do not have adequate control of market risk profile
as the risk appetite is derived from market prices. This approach forces us to assume constant
risk appetite in a sequence, which may not be valid at least in the less informed sessions
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where we observe unstable and trendy risk appetite adjustments between market sequences.
Thus future work should focus on using induced risk appetite through experimental control
on payoff profile to refine the results of our findings.
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3.0 GIVING ACCORDING TO THE RULES: A STUDY OF MONETARY
GIFT EXCHANGE IN CHINA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
“IT WAS a big week for Wang Wei. On a recent Wednesday she had two weddings to
attend, then on Saturday, two funerals. ... by custom she was obliged to bring cash gifts.
That was no hardship a decade ago, when the going rate for four banquets was the equivalent
of $5-10... It is a hardship now...This week Ms Wang’s outlays added up to 350 yuan, or
close to $60—about a month’s income. A pleasant, open-faced woman of 41, she says it is
money she could have used to buy basic appliances. A water heater would be nice, she says,
so her husband, in-laws and two teenage children wouldn’t have to boil water to bathe...”
-The Economist (Nov 30, 2013)
Human society spends an enormous amount of money on gifts each year. For example, the
American households typically spend 3-4% of their income on gift purchases (Prendergast and
Stole (2001)). The welfare loss due to sub-optimal choice of gift can amount to approximately
10% of the face value of gifts (Caplow (1982), Waldfogel (1993), (2002)).
Gift exchange plays an important role in social interactions to build and improve social
ties. A proper gift can signal the goodwill to strengthen family bond and/or improve both
giver’s and receiver’s emotional well-being while a poor choice of gift not only results in
social welfare loss but also potentially causes emotional damage due to deteriorating quality
of relationship and the loss of “face.”
Gift exchange could also impose financial burdens on participants involved in the process.
Academic studies of the rural gift culture in China (Chen (2014), Chen et al. (2011)) find
that there is significant increase in gift expenditure in recent years. In Guizhou, from 2005
to 2009 average gift amounts in three rural villages grew by 18-45% annually, compared with
10% annual income growth; a study by Brown et al. (2011) shows that between 2004 and
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2006, the share of spending on gifts and festivals soared from 8 to 14 percent and the average
wedding cost for the groom’s family was approximately 5.5 times the per capita income. So
it is important that we understand the motivations and social norms behind people’s giving
behaviors, and the economic impact on people involved in the gift-exchange process.
The nature of gift economy is the subject of a fundamental debate in anthropology. The
early anthropological research on gift exchange begins with the study of Kula Ring in the
Trobriand Islands by Malinowski (1922). Mauss (1967) emphasizes the exchange nature of
gifts in “primitive societies,” where gifts are similar to loans which are expected to be repaid
in the future, thus reciprocity plays an essential role.
Sociologists follow and expand the view of anthropologists by focusing on social functions
associated with gift exchange behavior including building and confirming identity, exerting
control, and defining social status (Schwartz (1967)).
For economists, one of the most puzzling features of gift exchange is the choice of non-
monetary gifts over simply giving money, which offers recipients complete freedom of choice.
Thus economic research on gift exchange often focuses on the strategic benefits of giving.
One explanation for the preference for non-monetary gifts is “the thought that counts.”
What’s important is a giver’s willingness to spend time and effort searching for the right
gift. For instance, carefully chosen non-monetary gifts could signal the quality of a donor’s
information on the preference of the recipient (Prendergast and Stole (2001)). Similarly,
the transfer of a non-monetary gift of proper value can demonstrate the giver’s intention for
future cooperation (Camerer (1988)). In both cases, the benefits from conveying meaningful
messages outweigh the welfare loss of using non-monetary gifts.
Gift exchange can also help establish reciprocal relationships. Akerlof (1982) interprets
involuntary unemployment in terms of the response of firms to workers’ group behavior,
i.e. firms use above market-clearing wage as gifts to induce more effort from workers. A
large literature in experimental economics including Fehr et al. (1998), Gneezy and List
(2006), Falk (2007) and Kube et al. (2012) investigates the gift-exchange relationship in
laboratory and field experimental markets, often finding evidence of increased reciprocity
and cooperation through gift exchange.
In an extreme time of crisis, a reciprocal relationship through gift exchange could mean
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the difference between normality and catastrophe. Coate and Ravallion (1993) invent a
mutual insurance model in which households give gifts to others with whom they have fewer
enforcement problems. Schechter (2007) illustrates how farmers use gifts to deter theft and
encourage honesty in rural Paraguay.
Historically, anthropologists and sociologists have made significant contributions to im-
prove our understanding of social changes in China’s gift culture. Using a survey study
based on detailed written accounts collected from 283 families living in Peiping (now Bei-
jing), Gamble (1933) analyzes urban Chinese families’ income and expenditure in 1920s,
which includes records on ten local weddings. Lang (1946) combines both historical research
and field work to detail the cultural changes experienced in China in the 1940s, which also
includes the study on Chinese weddings and marriage in urban China based in Beijing.
Through a survey study conducted in Xiajia village, Heilongjiang province, Yan (1996)
investigates the cultural changes of gift exchange in rural China under communist rule, and
documents the intensified social competition in local gift economy in terms of larger wedding
banquets and larger share of income spent on gifts.
Joy (2001) explores the social norms in gift-giving practices by conducting interviews
in Hong Kong to demonstrate how the existence of a continuum of social ties in social
relationships influences giving behaviors.
Conducting empirical economic research on gift exchange often faces several difficulties.
First, monetary and non-monetary gifts coexist in the field while the latter often create
difficulty for the valuation of gifts. The difficulty of collecting, tracking and valuing gift
transactions in complex social networks also limits the scope of research on relation-specific
giving.
Another issue posed by non-monetary gifts is the diverse meanings and sentiments as-
sociated with different choices of gift. For instance, giving an expensive engagement ring or
an apartment demonstrates the commitment for a long term relationship whereas a token
gift to a potential business client simply signals the intention of starting a relationship. This
complexity of non-monetary gift exchange makes it difficult to understand the composition
of a family’s gift expenditure.
Due to these practical difficulties, economic research in recent times on giving mainly
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focuses on analyzing total gift expenditure of households over a fixed period (e.g. one year).
Peer effect and status concerns often dictate socially observable spending. Social spending is
either positional in nature or subject to herding behavior (Brown et al. (2011)). A study by
Chen et al. (2011) tests three competing hypotheses of the poor households’ over-spending on
gifts including peer effect, status concern, and risk-pooling based on a census-type household
survey in three Chinese rural villages, and they find that gift giving is largely influenced by
peer effect and status concern.
The approach of focusing on aggregate gift expenditure improves our understanding of the
impact of the community-wide social comparison on giving. However, in addition to social
comparison, giving is often specific to the features of dyadic relationship, e.g. reciprocity and
the desire to maintain the balance of giving within a personal relation. Thus in this paper,
I make a first attempt to explore the social norms that dictate monetary gift exchange for
Chinese weddings. Using this method, I investigate the evolution of the size of monetary
giving over time.
In recent years, monetary wedding gift exchange has become the social norm in more af-
fluent urban areas in China and the monetary gifts collectively can have significant impact on
the welfare of recipients. Thus giving decisions often involve careful consideration. Through
a survey by collecting thirty-five families’ private gift records, I trace each gift transaction
to individual relationship in order to discover the rules governing dyadic giving over time
(Lowrey et al. (2004)). More specifically, the study focuses on the impact of the nature of
relationship (kinship vs. friendship/working relationship) and gift history, and the evolution
of the size of monetary gifts over time.
Results show that people calibrate in favor of their relatives compared with their friends
and colleagues. This preference towards kinship holds even after we control the quality of
relationships, which implies the higher value Chinese place on kinship over other types of
social ties. People are also more generous towards others with whom they consider having
better quality of relationship.
In addition, the size of monetary gifts grows slower than the average city-wide disposable
income, which contradicts the status competition model. Though the size of initial giving
increases faster than the price level, its size as a proportion of the average disposable income
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declines over time. This result suggests that the burden of giving due to status competition
is not caused by the size of monetary giving, but is more likely to be associated with other
factors, e.g. non-monetary giving on visible status goods, rising frequency of giving caused
by more social events and/or larger scope of giving due to larger social network.
When examining the impact of gift history, I find that return gifts tend to add a premium
compared with the size of initial gifts. The added premium also exists when measured as
a proportion of average disposable income though its size declines as initial gifts become
larger.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: next section discusses the wedding
gift exchange culture in China. Then I provide a conceptual framework to illustrate the
impact of social reference on giving behaviors in both social norm model and status com-
petition model. Section 3.4 describes the methodology of data collection, while Section 3.5
summarizes results. The last section concludes.
3.2 WEDDING GIFT-EXCHANGE IN CHINA
The recorded social custom of monetary gift exchange in urban China can be traced back to
as early as 1920s in the survey study presented in Gamble (1933):
“In order to distribute the burden somewhat and make it possible for friends and relatives to
help meet the extraordinary expenses, it is the custom in Peiping to give presents of money
at the time of weddings.”
Further, non-monetary presents including cloth, flowers, food and objects for personal use
were often sent back then.
Yan (1996) reveals similar customs in rural village Xiajia: cash gifts are given by the
guests to the wedding host while various kinds of non-monetary gifts are given to the bride
and groom as a property-owning unit for their own use; however, “the monetary gifts to the
hosts are the most salient prestations, both quantitatively and qualitatively.”
One common feature of wedding gifts in China pointed out in Yan (1996) is the alien-
ability of gifts that gifts do not contain any “supernatural power” or special meaning in
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and of them. For instance, unlike a chocolate given to a lover on Valentine’s day or an
engagement ring for marriage proposal that are closely associated with the givers’ identity
or status, the main purpose of giving in China is to generate utility for recipients rather
than exerting power or confirming superior status over them. Thus “most material gifts are
consumer goods such as wine, cigarettes, and canned food,” all of which are expected to be
used by the recipient. In fact, it is common practice that wine and food received on the
wedding day could be used in the wedding dinner immediately. Thus the choices of wedding
gift in China have the tendency to cut welfare loss or offer more help while meaning or spirit
is mainly reflected in the value of gifts. This feature makes it a natural process to transform
to pure monetary gift exchange as people’s spending power increases with the country’s fast
economic growth in recent years.
Today, people in China give monetary gifts for selected but often very important occa-
sions and sometimes only within particular nature of relationship. For example, like in many
other cultures, Chinese rarely use money as birthday gifts as the spirit of birthday party is
clearly more important, and during Chinese New Year celebration only seniors give money
to children. By contrast, giving monetary gifts for Chinese wedding has become the social
norm in more affluent urban areas where large monetary gifts are more affordable due to the
fast rising urban income and property price.
With $4,6441 annual disposable income per person in 2014 according the National Bureau
of Statistics of China (2014), the total bill of a Chinese wedding could easily exceed $20,000
counting a pair of rings, a bridal gown, a banquet, a photo shoot, a professional planner
and a honeymoon tour, not including the sky-rocketing housing price in major cities. Thus
donating monetary gifts could potentially have major effect on receiving families’ cash flow
that bears the burden of wedding, which also accentuates the need to reduce the waste
resulted from suboptimal non-monetary gifts.
Studying wedding gift exchange brings several benefits to improve the quality of our
analysis. First, each wedding has a large number of gift transactions (typically more than
1The estimate is obtained from converting 28844 RMB at exchange rate of 6.21:1 CHY:USD at the end
of 2014.
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one hundred2) with a wide range of relationship including kinship, friendship and working
relationship.
The private monetary gift records kept by many people3 simplify the data collection
process. Moreover, China’s single child policy since 1980s means that the majority of urban
Chinese families hold only one wedding for their children, thus we can match wedding gifts
into unique initial-return pairs, which helps us identify the impact of different relation specific
features on giving behaviors.
Since the gift transaction process is initiated by the wedding couple’s family rather than
givers (e.g. a giver may initiate giving in order to establish business relation), focusing on
wedding gift exchange reduces the complexity of analyzing the motivations for giving.
The customs for wedding gift exchange in the city of Qingdao where the survey was
conducted are described as following4. The hosts (i.e. the groom, the bride and their
parents) send invitations to guests one to two months before the wedding day. Then to plan
the reception, they start the headcount of the number of guests each invited individual plans
to bring to the wedding banquet. Gift money is sealed in a red envelope with the giver’s
name written on the back. Upon their arrival on the wedding day, guests deliver the envelope
to a red box at the reception. Depending on the preference of hosts, the red envelopes may
be opened on-site and recorded immediately (with givers’ name and the amount), or the
hosts may opt to check and record gifts after the wedding. A return gift happens when there
are similar events happening to the initial giving family, e.g. a wedding or a childbirth.
Another important feature of monetary gift exchange for modern Chinese weddings is
that, unlike western weddings in which the groom and bride keep all the gifts, the ultimate
receiver of each monetary gift depends on who owns the relationship with the giver. For
instance, a groom’s parents keep and record all gifts received from people in their social
network, and thus are also responsible for any return gift in the future, i.e. gift exchange is
always relationship specific. Note, even though kinship is maintained at the family level, each
2The large and elaborate ritual seems to a phenomenon formed after the 1949 Revolution. Yan (1996)
reports that according to older informants for the survey, the number of guests normally ranged from 30 to
50 for ordinary villagers, and only landlords or the local elite would have more than 100 guests prior to 1949.
3The existence of private gift books is widely found in research on gift exchange in China, for example,
Gamble (1933), Lang (1946), Yan (1996) and Chen et al. (2011).
4Jiang et al. (2015) provide a more detailed description of the procedure of Chinese wedding.
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giving often targets a specific person within the receiving family. For example, gifts from
one of the groom’s (paternal) cousins and the cousin’s parents would be recorded separately
as one gift from the cousin to the groom and one gift from the cousin’s parents to the
groom’s parents; or if the cousin and the cousin’s parents gave a gift together, the gift would
be recorded as one gift from the cousin’s parents to the groom’s parents. This structure
of gift transactions simplifies the process of distinguishing the impact of different types of
relationship and different gift histories.
With monetary gifts, any potential meaning conveyed through gifts is simplified to the
monetary value of gifts. However, the meaning conveyed by each gift can still be com-
plex, including the signaling of a giver’s wealth, altruism/reciprocity, the face/status related
competition and merely following social norm.
The nature and quality of relationship are important factors that determine the combi-
nations of motivation behind a gift decision. As noted in Yang (1994), “the value of a gift (or
the amount of money) reflects the degree of closeness between giver and recipient.” Using
a survey study conducted in Hong Kong, Joy (2001) finds that as the closeness of relation-
ships increases, the nature of gift dynamics evolves from satisfying obligations or formality
to the desire to impress by demonstrating intimate sentiments. For instance, a close relative
can give a large monetary gift due to the long term nature of kinship. In addition, when
the relationship is close and long term, givers tend to focus on receivers’ needs and are less
concerned with balancing the gift exchange relationship. In contrast, when givers are casual
friends, an inappropriately large gift not only puts givers at the risk of financial loss with
less than expected payback but also could be interpreted as an exertion of power and status
by putting receivers in an inferior position. Thus one focus of our research questions is the
social norms that Chinese society follows to balance the needs for the willingness to help,
the risk of financial loss and the status.
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3.3 MONETARY GIFT-EXCHANGE, SOCIAL NORM AND STATUS
COMPETITION
This section provides a conceptual framework to illustrate the impact of social norm and
status competition on giving behaviors in the institution of monetary gift exchange.
Following the approach adopted in Brown et al. (2011), I start with a general specification
that captures the idea that people care about their own consumption and status relative to
those of others through the comparisons of monetary giving.
Define Ii as individual i ’s financial constraint that restricts her ability to spend, and
define xij as i’s choice of a “visible” good (i.e. a monetary gift) that is transferred to
receiver j and carries certain message to the receiver, e.g. wealth, status, the desire for a
reciprocal relationship; thus yi = Ii−xij is i’s spending on private goods and/or visible non-
monetary goods. Also define r(x, kij , hij) as the measure of social reference for i’s giving.
It depends on the average spending on monetary gifts by the general public in the reference
community x, a social norm for monetary giving that reflects the nature of relationship kij
(e.g. relatives, friends or colleagues), and the state of the relationship hij , i.e. the quality
of relationship and past gift history between i and j. Zi is a vector of socioeconomic and
demographic variables. Assume agent i’s utility as follows:
Ui = U(xij , r; Zi; Ii) (3.1)
where we have used the budget constraint Ii = xij + yi to eliminate yi.
If subject i is concerned with following the social norm r, i.e. the absolute difference
between xij and r, then one possible specification of the previous utility function is as follows:
Ui = αiS(−|xij − r|) + (1− αi)V (xij , Ii − xij) (3.2)
In Eq. (3.2), S is a sub-utility function capturing the benefits of following social norms with
S
′
> 0 (i.e. the marginal distaste towards deviating from the norm increases with the size of
the deviation), V is a sub-utility function capturing utility from other consumption. Adding
concern for social comparison increases the motive to adjust spending on gifts in order to
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follow the herd. αi ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength of concerns for social comparison relative
to own consumption. As αi → 0, the problem reduces to a conventional utility maximization
exercise in which social comparison plays no role.
Ui = αiS(xij − r) + (1− αi)V (xij , Ii − xij) (3.3)
By contrast, in the status competition model (Eq. (3.3)) studied in Brown et al. (2011),
the desire for higher status through outspending the social reference level r (i.e. the average
yearly family gift spending in the studied village) accelerates the rise of the family gift
spending in the village over time so that it increases faster than the growth of income. The
intensifying status competition increases the burden of local families and causes significant
waste on status gifts.
However, the question of status competition becomes more complicated when taking
account of giving between individuals and/or families. After all, a family’s total gift spending
is the sum of all individual giving to other individuals or families, so the escalating status
spending could arise from increasing giving to members of existing relations through larger
and/or more frequent giving, expanding the scope of giving (i.e. giving to more people), or
both.
For αi > 0, both the social norm model and the status model imply that giving increases
with the reference level.
∂xij
∂r
> 0 (3.4)
Two implications are derived from Eq. (3.4) for the relation between the size of monetary
gifts and the reference. First, social comparison triggers a ”keep up with the Joneses”
response, thus people choose the size of monetary gifts based on their respective reference
group. When calibrating, givers acknowledge that they value some recipients more highly
than others and adjust their giving to reflect this difference. To follow the social norm,
a relative should follow other relatives who have similar quality of relationship with the
recipient.
In contrast, status driven givers would compete to beat the social reference giving, which
in turn is derived from all individual giving. Thus as the real income rises, status competition
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would drive social reference to accelerate faster than the growth of real income, i.e. the size
of giving accounts for a larger proportion of real income as income increases.
In our analysis, I compare the impact of two different types of relationship on the size
of gifts: kinship vs other types of relationship including both friendship and working re-
lationship. Then I test the effect of rising local average disposable income on the size of
gifts.
Second, current gift decision correlates with past gift transaction history between the
giver and the recipient. For wedding gift exchange studied in this paper, the return gift from
individual j to i should correspond to the size of the initial gift received from i. Again, the
real disposable income should have limited impact on the size of norm driven return gifts in
contrast to the status model.
However, the impact of gift history is more difficult to identify. For any dyadic relation-
ship, common sense tells us that the mutual feelings tend to be symmetric, which implies
that similar initial and return gifts may merely suggest that the feelings between the two
parties are similar rather than the interdependence between future and past gift transac-
tions. Thus to capture the effect of gift history requires accurately measuring any difference
of mutual feelings, which is a very difficult task in practice.
Instead, we focus on the factors that influence the difference between the initial and
return gifts. As Eq. (3.4) shows, when a giver has more concern for the deviation from social
norms, the difference between of the initial gift and the return gift decreases; by contrast,
the difference between the return gift and the initial gift always increases with the concern
for status.
Social norm :
∂|xij−r|
∂αi
< 0
Status seeking :
∂(xij−r)
∂αi
> 0 ; (3.5)
In this study, I use the nature and quality of relationship as proxy that affects the level
of concern over the deviation from the reference. For instance, due to the concern for family
reputation, the incentive to return a larger real gift may be stronger between relatives while
following others or equality dictates the size of return gift to a colleague.
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3.4 METHODOLOGY
The data used in this paper are collected from a 2014 survey study conducted in Qingdao,
a major city in eastern China. Thus unlike previous studies (Wei and Zhang (2011), Brown
et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2011)) whose survey data is collected from remote rural villages
of China, our results are most relevant to giving behaviors in a more affluent modern city
where monetary gifts are more affordable.
The survey uses a snowball sampling method which sends survey questionnaires to thirty-
five individuals from the researcher and his family’s social network. The survey questionnaire
includes two sections5 that collect basic demographic information and gift records, respec-
tively. The section for demographic information asks subjects’ sex, marriage status and
year of marriage, and financial situation. The gift records collect detailed information on
each monetary gift transaction (The detailed questionnaire of the survey is included in Ap-
pendix B.1).
The study uses three sets of parameters to evaluate the impact of different types of social
references on giving decisions. To verify the existence of gift calibration that is based on
the type of relationship (Joy (2001) and Lowrey et al. (2004)), all types of relationship are
divided into two groups: kin and non-kin (including friends or colleagues).
Kinship is often considered as having stronger social ties than friendship and working
relationship as it reflects a long history of norm, trust and reciprocity among blood relations.
According to Yan (1996), when members in this social network engage in gift exchange, they
not only represent themselves but also their own family’s “face.” Thus they have strong
incentive to maintain and protect family image and status in this social network, which
explains why people appear to be most generous when giving to relatives.
In addition to the natural bonds between relatives, people could also voluntarily form
long term relationship with friends when they find common interests and mutual affection
through repeated social interactions. However, since friendship usually happens at individual
level, it is not subject to as much peer influence and monitoring as from family members. So
5The survey actually used two versions of questionnaire. For those individuals or families who or whose
children hadn’t got married thus had no opportunity to receive wedding gifts, I used a shorter and simpler
questionnaire that contained two sections including demographic information and giving first record only
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a friend may feel less obligated to follow the herd, thus giving and/or returning from friends
is often less than a relative.
In contrast, a working relationship is explicitly formed for a common purpose, thus there
is neither natural bonds through family connections nor mutual affection through voluntary
friendship between colleagues, which limits the potential for building long term reciprocal re-
lationship, therefore, a colleague give the least though s/he may also have strongest tendency
to follow the herd.
However, there is a practical difficulty in separating friendship from working relation-
ships because friendship and working relationships may coexist. Thus this paper focuses on
comparing giving decisions of kin and unrelated actors.
Another complication arises from the complex structure of kinship networks. Different
giving from relatives could also reflect the higher quality of relationships associated with
kinship. In order to separate the influences of these two factors, the survey also asks subjects
to evaluate the quality of each relationship on a 1-10 scale (See Appendix B.2).
Gift exchange may also reflect a dynamic and repeated process. As we discussed previ-
ously, in addition to the tendency to follow the herd, gift transactions within each relation
could follow different tracks that depend on past giving actions. In order to measure this
dynamic effect, we investigate the factors behind the difference between the wedding gift
one received in the past and the wedding gift she returns in the future including the type of
relationship, the quality of relationships and the size of initial gifts.
Last, in order to test the evolution of social giving over time, we use two metrics for the
measure of gift size: real gifts adjusted by 2014 CPI in Qingdao to take account of the effect
of inflation, and the size of gift as a proportion of average disposable income in the year of
gift transaction.
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3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected records of 912 (611 initial gifts and 301 return gifts, i.e. 301 initial-return
gift pairs) wedding-gift transactions from 33 individuals through the survey conducted in
Qingdao in August 2014. Among the 27 surveyed subjects who voluntarily reported their
income range, 21 of them belong to high or highest income group6 in Qingdao based on their
income level in 2010. In addition, all 23 married subjects own an apartment. Thus given
the income level and the residential housing price level ($1472 per square meter on average
with average residential housing area of 29.8 square meters per person) in Qingdao in 2014
according to the 2014 Qingdao Yearbook (2014), the majority of survey subjects are unlikely
to face significant financial constraint when making gift decisions.
Nearly half (47%) of the initial gift decisions and the majority (84%) of the return
decisions were made between 2010 and 2014. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the size
of initial and return gifts using two metrics: real gifts valued at 2014 CPI price level of
Qingdao and the size of gifts as a proportion of the average disposable income in the year of
gift transaction. The real value of initial gifts ranges from 100 Yuan to 10,000 Yuan7 with
the median gift of 600 Yuan, and the real value of the return gifts ranges from 100 Yuan to
22,800 Yuan with the median gift of 800 Yuan. Nearly one quarter (22.2% of initial gifts and
23.9% of return gifts) of the gifts are worth more than 5% of the city-wide average disposable
income. Both types of gifts are highly skewed to the left with 82% of the initial gifts and
69% of the return gifts less than or equal to 1,000 Yuan. 79% and 21% of the initial gifts
were exchanged between colleagues/friends and relatives, respectively; 85% and 15% of the
return gifts were traded between colleagues/friends and relatives, respectively.
Finding 1: Giving between relatives is larger than from other types of relationship.
Figure 8 shows the relation between the size of monetary gifts and the type of relationship.
The three panel groups compare the distribution of the gift size between kin and non-kin
6The categorization is adopted from the one used in the 2010 Yearly Book created by National Bureau
of Statistics of China, Qingdao.
7The exchange rate between Yuan and US dollar from 2010 and 2014 declined from 6.8:1 to 6.1:1
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Figure 7: Distribution of the Size of Gifts
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Figure 8: Size of Gifts and Nature of Relationship
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for all initial gifts, initial gifts that have had return gifts recorded at the time of survey
(Initials—Returns) and all return gifts, respectively. The purpose to analyze the initial gifts
conditional on the existence of return gifts is to reduce the possibility that some initial givers
might give less because they did not expect any return gift in the future.
In all three groups, relatives tend to give and return significantly more than friends
and/or colleagues (p − value < 0.001 for Welch Two Sample t-test). However, gifts from
relatives are less predictable than from other types of relationship in terms of the variance
of gift size (p− value < 0.001 for F-test).
A potential reason for the latter result is the significant variance of kinship structure.
For instance, the giving from a distant cousin may not be significantly different from a friend
or colleague while a brother who wishes to build on an existing strong bond is more likely to
give more than other relatives. This potential difference between the quality of relationship
and social ties raises an important question as to whether the higher giving from relatives is
driven by the natural bond of blood relationship or merely originates from better quality of
relationship. Thus we try to separate the effect of kinship from the quality of relationship
next.
Figure 9 compares the size of gifts from relatives with gifts from friends/colleagues in
different relation quality groups for all initial gifts, initial gifts that have return gifts and
return gifts, respectively. The categories are based on the definitions of relation quality
subjects used in the survey questionnaires (See Appendix B.1), i.e. very good: 9-10, good:
7-8 and average or below: < 7 (We use 9-10 and less than 9 because there are only two
initial-return gift pairs for relation quality below 7).
Table 5 summarizes the test results of pairwise comparison in different relation quality
groups. Even after controlling the relation quality, giving from relatives is larger than friends
and colleagues at 5% or lower significance level in all testing groups. The result remains when
we focus on initial gifts that have return gifts. Thus kinship is on average valued higher than
friendship and working relationship. In addition, the variance of gift size from relatives is
again more pronounced than other relationships, which suggests that social norms for giving
between relatives are more complex than for other types of relationship.
Finding 2: Real return gifts are larger than real initial gifts. However, there is no signif-
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Figure 9: Distribution of the Size of Gifts
(a) Initial Gifts, Relation Quality and Kinship
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(b) Initial Gifts|Return, Quality and Kinship
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(c) Return Gifts, Quality and Kinship
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Table 5: Testing Giftkinship > Giftothers in Different Relation-Quality Groups
Welch Two Sample t-test (p-value) F-test of variances (p-value)
Quality Initials Initials|Returns Returns Initials Initials|Returns Returns
9 - 10 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Below 9 0.001∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Figure 10: Initial-Return Gift Pairs for Kin and Non-kin
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Figure 11: Initial-Return Gift Pairs (% Income) for Kin and Non-kin
icance between the size of return gifts and initial gifts after accounting for the rising
disposable income.
Figure 10 compares the initial-return gift pairs between related and non-kin pairs for real
initial gifts (adjusted by CPI) less than 8000 Yuan. The return gifts are larger than initial
gifts received in the past using paired t-test (p− value : 0.000). In addition, given an initial
gift, returns from relatives tend to be larger than friends/colleagues (p−value : 0.005) using
a simple regression of return gifts on initial gifts (with interaction with relation type). Thus
not only relatives tend to give more but also return more.
The larger real return gifts than the initial gifts may merely reflect the fast rising real
disposable income in the city of Qingdao as the real disposable income increased on average
10.4% per year between 2005 and 2014, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of
China in Qingdao (2014). Indeed, on average there is no significant difference between
the initial gifts and the return gifts when the size of gifts is measured as a proportion of
disposable income. However, the result depends on the type of relationship: the return gifts
from relatives are still larger than the initial gifts at 10% significance level according to
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the paired t-test (p-value: 0.093); by contrast, there is no significant difference between the
initial and return gifts for non-kin.
3.5.2 Regression Analysis
Results in the previous section illustrate the significant value that Chinese society places
on kinship over other types of social ties. However, there are still significant unaccounted
variations in gifts between relatives even after controlling the quality of relationship.
Similarly, a casual inspection of the initial-return relation in Figure 10 and Figure 11
reveals that at larger gift levels, the initial-return relationship exhibits significant larger
volatility; in contrast, the initial-return link between friends and colleagues is relatively
stable across different sizes of initial gifts. Thus in this section, I seek to refine our analysis
to incorporate more factors using regression analysis. We begin with the analysis of initial
gifts, turning to return gifts and initial-return relation later.
3.5.2.1 Initial Gifts For initial gifts, I estimate models of the following reduced form:
Initialij = αKinshipij + βQualityij + δCostij + yearly trend+ fixed effect (3.6)
Initialijstands for the size of initial gift from person i to person j. Dummy variable
Kinshipij captures the nature of relationship as discussed earlier. Qualityij measures the
quality of relationship estimated by surveyed subject i. Costij are measures for the cost of
wedding: a dummy variable that controls for the prestige of restaurants (1 if 4 star hotel
or above) and the number of guests giver i brought to the wedding banquet. The former
is a measure of wedding cost determined by the host’s choice, which also reflects the host’s
ability to pay, e.g. wealth. The latter approximates the cost of the wedding banquet caused
by the invited guest, i.e. the more guests she brings, the more the host has to pay for the
wedding. The yearly trend captures the trend of gift size over time. Last, fixed effect
controls for the unobserved heterogeneity of surveyed subjects’ social networks.
Table 6 and 7 present the results of the OLS regressions for initial gifts. All initial gifts
are divided into two groups: initial gift decisions made by the surveyed subjects and initial
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Table 6: Initial Gift Decisions Made by Surveyed Families
FROM Surveyed Subjects
Real Initial (Base: 2014) % (Initial/Disposable Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kinship 1294.47∗∗∗ 251.76 4.18∗∗∗ 1.11
(1 if from a relative) (202.47) (289.69) (0.71) (1.03)
Quality of Relationship 646.36∗∗∗ 358.47∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗
(1 if “very good”: 9 or 10) (147.08) (153.36) (0.51) (0.55)
Kinship * Quality 1639.63∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗
(337.22) (1.20)
Restaurant -31.88 -20.47 0.20 0.23
(1 if 4 star or above) (114.35) (110.01) (0.40) (0.39)
Number of Guest Brought 511.58∗∗∗ 486.44∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(91.90) (88.55) (0.32) (0.32)
Yearly Trend 29.01 36.97 -0.29∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(24.30) (23.43) (0.09) (0.08)
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.65
N 311 311 311 311
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Initial Gifts Received by Surveyed Families
TO Surveyed Subjects
Real Initial (Base: 2014) % (Initial/Disposable Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kinship 1317.88∗∗∗ 240.48 2.29∗∗ 1.13
(1 if from a relative) (205.08) (297.97) (0.90) (1.03)
Quality of Relationship 662.75∗∗∗ 392.01∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 1.68∗
(1 if “very good”: 9 or 10) (149.79) (154.55) (0.80) (0.94)
Kinship * Quality 1659.54∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗
(344.15) (1.65)
Restaurant -26.85 -20.38 -1.44 -3.79∗∗
(1 if 4 star or above) (115.30) (110.84) (1.44) (1.78)
Number of attendees 495.35∗∗∗ 475.67∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗
(93.66) (90.13) (0.37) (0.37)
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.65 0.68 0.35 0.39
N 311 311 254 254
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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gifts received by the surveyed subjects. For the former, the fixed effect controls for the
individual giving pattern specific to each surveyed subject, e.g. different levels of generosity
caused by different ability to pay. For the latter, the fixed effect captures the heterogeneity of
giving patterns between different subjects’ social groups. For example, if social networks are
formed based on members’ financial situations, a surveyed subject who is financially better
off is more likely to receive larger gifts than others because of her friends’ higher ability to
pay. Note, there is no variable to control yearly trend in Table 7 because the gifts received
by surveyed subjects concentrated on ten weddings hosted by the their families in different
years, and adding both fixed effect and yearly trend would result in perfect multi-collinearity.
Results are similar between the gift decisions made by the surveyed subjects and the gifts
received by them. The regression analysis confirms earlier findings in the non-parametric
analysis: for both measures of the size of gifts, the relationship of better quality tends to
generate larger gifts; giving from relatives is larger than from friends and colleagues. This
premium for the size of gifts traded between relatives is caused by the larger giving associated
with kinship of higher relation quality (Collumn 2 and 4). Thus the marginal benefit of a
better relationship is larger for kinship than for other types of relationship.
Another feature stands out is the relative constant real value of initial gifts (adjusted
by the CPI) shown in the analysis of gift decisions made by the surveyed subjects. Taking
account of the fast rising real disposable income in Qingdao in the last decade, the size of
initial gifts grows slower than the average city-wise disposable income. Thus social compe-
tition for status appears to have limited impact on giving at individual level. This result
implies that the burden of giving is more likely to be attributed to other factors such as
the increase in the frequency of giving and/or the larger scope of giving due to more social
events and larger social network.
3.5.2.2 Return Gifts and Initial-Return Gift Relation Because the same factors
may underlie the giving decisions for both initial and return gifts, the analysis for the in-
fluence of the size of initial gifts on return gifts is more complex. In this subsection, we
first investigate whether there is systematic difference between the size of initial and return
gifts by introducing a dummy variable DReturnij (1 for return gifts) to Model (3.6). The
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coefficient of the return dummy captures the difference between initial and return gifts:
Size of Giftij = θDReturnij + αKinshipij + βQualityij +
δCostij + yearly trend+ fixed effect (3.7)
The estimation focuses on initial-return pairs recorded in our survey (i.e. drop initial
giving that has no return gifts recorded at the time of survey) to filter out giving that
anticipates no return.
First, I estimate Model (3.7) to measure the average difference between the size of initial
and return gifts controlling for other variables. Then the interactions DReturnij ∗Kinshipij
and DReturnij ∗Qualityij are added to measure the marginal effect of kinship and relation
quality on the size of return gifts, respectively.
Table 8 reports the results for the comparison between initial and return gifts. The return
gifts are on average larger than the initial gifts for both metrics of the size of gift, ceteris
paribus. The premium of return gifts over initial gifts could potentially result in escalating
gift exchange if the trade of gifts is a repeated process.
Note, the insignificant yearly trend in Column 4-6 is the result of multi-collinearity
problem caused by the presence of fixed effect (i.e. many return and initial gifts are recorded
for the ten weddings reported in the survey). After dropping the fixed effect, the result in
Column (7) shows that the size of gift as a proportion of income declines over time.
Next, we investigate the determinants for the difference of initial-return gift pairs. Specif-
ically, we estimate the following model:
Diff(gift)ji = ηInitialij + αKinshipji + βQualityji + δinitialCostij +
δreturnCostji + +Diff(year)ji + fixed effect (3.8)
Diff(gift)ji is the difference between the initial-return gift pair for relation ij, i.e. Returnji
− Initialij . Initialij is the size of initial gifts, which captures the impact of the size of initial
gifts on returning decisions. Because common factors may denominate both Initialij and
Returnji , we use the fitted values of Initialij as proxy for the size of initial gifts when
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Table 8: Compare the Size of Initial and Return Gifts
Real Gift (Base: 2014) %(Gift/Disposable Income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DReturn 3155.45∗∗∗ 2922.24∗∗∗ 3047.64∗∗∗ 5.67∗∗ 5.73∗∗ 6.15∗∗ 1.11∗∗
(1 for return gifts) (730.64) (739.29) (745.91) (2.75) (2.79) (2.81) (0.52)
DReturn * Kinship 651.04∗ -0.18
(343.29) (1.29)
DReturn * Quality 200.53 -0.89
(276.50) (1.04)
Kinship 1243.00∗∗∗ 948.77∗∗∗ 1247.64∗∗∗ 4.43∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗∗ 5.45∗∗∗
(1 if from a relative) (210.79) (261.35) (210.97) (0.79) (0.99) (0.79) (0.77)
Quality of Relation 977.84∗∗∗ 976.69∗∗∗ 883.15∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗ 3.55∗∗∗
(1 if “very good”) (153.34) (152.99) (201.43) (0.58) (0.58) (0.76) (0.56)
Restaurant -25.97 -23.23 -20.20 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.04
(1 if 4 star or above) (146.32) (146.00) (146.60) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.47)
Number of attendees 501.45∗∗∗ 495.78∗∗∗ 497.59∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗
(80.00) (79.87) (80.21) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
Yearly Trend 44.35 47.37 44.82 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.46∗∗∗
(37.46) (37.41) (37.48) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10)
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.36
N 605 605 605 605 605 605 605
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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evaluating Model (3.8). In addition, we also measure the time value of money by adding the
difference between the year of return gift and the year of initial gift, Diff(year)ji with a
negative coefficient implying that return gifts are losing value.
Table 9 reports the impact of each determinant on the difference between initial and
return gift (we drop RestaurantInitial and Number of GuestsInitial in the column (2) (3) (5) and
(6) analysis to reduce the multi-collinearity when adding the fitted value of initial gift).
For real gifts adjusted by CPI, in Column (2), in the absence of the nature and quality of
relationship, the difference between a return gift and its corresponding initial gift increases
with the size of the initial gift. Given that return gifts tend to be larger than initial gifts
(according to results in Table 8), this result means that there is a 17% premium of return
gifts over initial gifts.
When taking account of the rising disposable income, the premium of return gifts over
initial gifts is declining. Though as a proportion of disposable income, return gifts are still
larger than initial gifts (Table 8), one percent increase in %(initial gift/income) only results in
slightly more than half (0.52) percent increase in %(return gift/income) in return. Therefore,
though giving larger initial gifts can generate profits in the future, the profit margin is quickly
declining because as the size of initial gifts increases, it becomes more expensive to return
with a premium of constant percentage. This reduced premium as a proportion of initial gifts
decreases the incentive to compete for higher status through monetary giving. Similarly, in
Column (4) and (5), there is a tendency for the size of return gifts as a proportion of
disposable income to drop by 0.20-0.23% of average disposable income per year.
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Using data gathered from personal monetary gift records for urban Chinese weddings, this
paper examines the factors behind giving behaviors within individual relationships. The
results document that people calibrate their monetary gift decisions based on the nature
and quality of relationships. Kinship and better relationship are often associated with both
larger initial and return gifts.
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Table 9: Difference between Initial and Return Gifts
Real Return - Real Initial %Return/Income − %Initial/Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 590.04∗∗ 320.18 612.67∗∗ 0.99 0.62 2.14∗
(266.33) (265.21) (277.48) (0.94) (0.94) (1.09)
Fitted Initial 0.17∗∗ -0.22 -0.09 -0.48∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.14) (6.66) (0.16)
Kinship 474.13∗∗∗ 584.62∗∗∗ 0.29 1.55∗∗
(1 if from a relative) 151.97 (211.51) (0.53) (0.77)
Quality of Relationship 210.23∗∗ 387.35∗∗ 0.16 1.65∗∗∗
(1 if “very good”) (107.01) (156.12) (0.38) (0.63)
Restaurant (Initial) 101.67 -0.03
(1 if 4 star or above) (97.36) (0.34)
No. of Guests (Initial) -173.60∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(72.44) (0.25)
Restaurant (Return) -202.35∗ -239.03∗∗ -231.13∗∗ -0.90∗∗ -0.85∗∗ -0.70∗
(108.83) (106.76) (105.37) 0.38 (0.37) (0.37)
No. of Guests (Return) 268.36∗∗∗ 235.08∗∗∗ 242.05∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(54.10) (50.57) (51.88) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Time Value 55.99∗∗ 57.57∗∗ 49.99∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.13
(22.94) (23.25) (23.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R2 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.17 0.15 0.17
N 288 288 288 288 288 288
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
57
Several potential explanations exist for the more generous giving behavior towards kin.
As reviewed in Cheng (2014), Chinese tend to put much stronger trust in family members
than western cultures shown in the extensive research on the significant family influence
over private business management in China. This trust and the need to maintain the trust
are reflected in the larger initial gifts to relatives and the corresponding larger reciprocal
return gifts in the future. Similarly, due to the stronger social ties from kinship than other
relationships, a giving decision not only shows a giver’s attitude towards the relationship
but is also an opportunity to solidify her family’s status or “face” in the kin network.
The growth of the size of monetary gifts in Qingdao lags behind the rising average city-
wide disposable income. Thus giving within a relationship do not escalate as suggested by
the status competition model. Rather, people tend to follow the social norm that requires
return more than initial gift (adjusted by CPI) for kinship and better relations but maintain
the balance between the initial and return gifts.
The burden of status competition is more likely to show in other forms of giving including
the increasing frequency and scope of giving, and/or larger giving or spending on non-
monetary goods (e.g. hosting a large and luxury wedding). For example, Yan (1996) discusses
that in early years after the 1949 Revolution, the land reform and the subsequent political
campaigns altered the previous system of social hierarchy, thus raising the hopes of ordinary
villages. With the potential aid of monetary and non-monetary gifts received for wedding
to partially relieve financial burden, people expand the size of wedding banquets with the
number of invited guests rising from between 30 and 50 prior to 1949 to today’s often over 100.
This expansion raises the scope of receiving and giving. Similarly, the social transformations
due to China’s economic reform since 1978 again motivate a new round of competition for
higher social status (Brown et al. (2011)). Moreover, other factors such as imbalanced gender
ratio reported in Wei and Zhang (2011) also intensify the race to compete for limited social
resources through building larger social networks through giving.
There are several limitations of the results in this paper. First, the results only apply
to monetary gift exchange. The perfect transferability nature of money hides or reduces
the incentive for status competition which often requires burning money through consuming
visible status goods not affordable by less wealthy families. Thus, the status competition
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may be reflected in the amount of money spent on weddings, which is not captured in our
data.
Our analysis uses self-reported data from surveyed subjects. This data collecting tech-
nique inevitably introduces selection bias and errors, thus future research should put in
more effort on collecting data of higher quality, e.g. collecting data at or immediately after
wedding.
In addition, we made a simplified assumption that the initial-return gift pairs are stan-
dalone events by disregarding prior- and post-wedding gift transactions.
Last, it is also important to investigate whether monetary giving restrains or encourages
burning money. On the surface, the monetary gifts reduce the financial burden of receiv-
ing families. However, by anticipating the monetary supports through collecting monetary
wedding gifts, the hosts can afford more expensive status goods which potentially further
intensifies the social competitions.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters each provide a perspective into the study of behavioral economics in
market economy and gift economy, respectively. These separate inquiries into each subfield
attempt to shed light on understanding the collective market action of asset pricing and
individual giving decisions under social influence.
Chapter 2 analyzed experimental data to investigate the impact of non-fundamental
information on asset pricing in markets with bankruptcy risk. The key finding is the reduced
price movements both within and between experimental periods when provided with public
information on a share’s intrinsic value and price histories. Providing more information
enhances price anchoring effect rather than improving price convergence toward intrinsic
values.
This result reveals a challenge to the conventional wisdom that more information and
transparency promote market efficiency. As observed in one of more informed sessions, under
the threat of bankruptcy risk, the reduced price volatility can trap share prices away from its
intrinsic value for extended periods. Even when prices are near intrinsic values, they are not
able to fully track the evolution of intrinsic values, thus the price stickiness can potentially
result in significant mis-pricing when assets experience large fundamental changes.
Chapter 3 investigated the social norms behind monetary gift exchange for urban Chinese
weddings. The paper shows that urban Chinese place more value on maintaining kinship
than other types of relationship. The size of monetary gifts as a proportion of average
city-wide disposable income decreases over time though for dyadic relationship, people are
conscious of maintaining the balance of giving by returning gifts of similar or larger size.
This result suggests that the size of monetary gifts is unlikely to be the source of status
competition (Wei and Zhang (2011), Brown et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2011)).
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2
A.1 EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM SCREENS
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Figure 12: Information Stage Screen for Informed Sessions
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Figure 13: Trading Stage Screen
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Figure 14: Outcome Stage Screen
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A.2 ASSET VALUATION WITH EXPONENTIAL UTILITY FUNCTION
The model consists of n players. Each player obtains value from periodic payoffs (i.e. divi-
dend) by owning shares or selling shares to other players for cash. We assume that the value
for each player is determined by the exponential utility function v(· ). As shown in Eq. (A.1),
the value of risky shares depends on players’ attitude/appetite towards risk. The level of
risk appetite is captured by α: a positive (negative) α implies risk aversion (risk seeking)
while α = 0 means risk neutrality.
v(c) =
c ifα = 01−e−αc
α
ifα 6= 0
(A.1)
In order to simplify the analysis, the model analysis adopts the parameters discussed in
previous section. The market valuation Vi for a share of quality i (i = A, B) is equal to:
Vi =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(λi,Highv(cHigh) + (1− λi,High)v(cLow)), i = A, B (A.2)
Players are impatient, which is captured by the discount factor β. We follow Camerer and
Weigelt (1993) and Crokett and Duffy (2013) to introduce discounting by using an indefinite
horizon with a constant continuation probability (β = 3
4
) in place of implementing an infinite
horizon with constant time discounting. λi, j (i = A, B, j = High, Low) is the probability
that the share of quality i generates a dividend of size j. cj (j = High, Low) is the dividend
earning of a share given a dividend announcement of j.
Using the numeric parameters for the experiment, the risk-neutral expected value of a
share of quality i simplifies to:
Vi = 4λi,High
1− e−150α
α
, i = A, B (A.3)
Thus in a risk neutral environment (α = 0), the value of owning a share is VA,α=0 = 400 for
share A and VB,α=0 = 200 for share B, which are also the intrinsic values. Moreover, since
the value function strictly decreases with the level of risk aversion α, the value of a share is
below (above) its intrinsic value for a risk averse (risk seeking) player.
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In order to simplify1 the comparison of risk appetite between sessions, we adopt a simpler
measure of risk appetite δ in place of the measure α used in the exponential value function
(Eq. (A.1)), where δ satisfies:
Vi,(α) = Vi(0) ∗ δ, i = A, B (A.4)
i.e. δ is the discount factor used to derive the risk-adjusted value from the the risk-neutral
value. Note, as shown in Eq. (A.4), since the exponential value function v(·) strictly de-
creases in the level of risk appetite α, δ strictly decreases in α. Thus δ is also a measure
of risk appetite, i.e. the higher (lower) is δ, the larger (smaller) is a player’s risk appetite.
Then the risk-adjusted value for each type of share can be rewritten as:
ShareA : VA = 400δ
ShareB : VB = 200δ ; (A.5)
Lemma 1: v(·) strictly decreases with the level of absolute risk aversion α
Proof. dv(c)
dα
= 1
α2
∗ (ce−cαα + e−cα − 1)
Since max(ce−cαα + e−cα − 1) = 0 at α = 0 (because d(ce−cαα+e−cα−1)
dα
= −c2e−cαα),
dv(c)
dα
= 1
α2
∗ (ce−cαα + e−cα − 1) < 0, α 6= 0 and dv(c)
dα
= 0, α = 0
Thus v(c) strictly decreases with the level of absolute risk aversion α.
A.3 EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
• Instruction for Less Informed Sessions
• Instruction for More Informed Sessions
1The measure of risk appetite α in Equation 3.3 has a non-linear relationship with the value of a share’s
value.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3
B.1 ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
B.1.1 Demographic Information
Question list:
1. Your gender: Male/Female
2. Your year of birth
3. Are you married? Yes/No. If you answer “Yes,” please specify the year when you got
married
4. Please fill the following table with you and your spouse’s average yearly income from
your permanent job or pension Your family (including you and your spouse)’s total family
income during 2003-2006 ; 2007-2010 ; 2011-2014 .
5. Do you or your spouse keep a record of monetary gifts you received in the past?
Yes/No.
6. Do you or your spouse keep a record of monetary gifts you gave to others in the past?
Yes/No.
B.1.2 “Receiving First + Giving Later” Gift Record Instructions
You are reading the “Receiving First + Giving Later” gift record instructions, so please write
your answers for each gift to the “Receiving First + Giving Later” forms. If you have any
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question, please call (omitted) or send email to (omitted).
This part records the gifts that you received first then gave later.
(1a) Please describe the nature of your relationship with the person who gave you the
gift: Relatives, Friends, Classmates, Colleagues, Other
(1b) You first met in Year (You can ignore this question if you are relatives)
(1c) Your counterpart is Male/Female
(1d) Please describe her/his family’s economic situation a. Very difficult b. Slightly
worse than average c. Average d. Slightly better than average e. Very good
(2) Year of the wedding:
(3a) Please choose a number between 1 and 10 that best describes the quality of your
relationship.(Note: the question asks the relationship quality at the year when you exchange
gift)
• “1” or “2” very bad, for example, both parties hate each other;
• “3” or “4” bad, for example, both parties dislike each other;
• “5” or “6” average, no special feelings;
• “7” or “8” good, for example, a friend or relative you care about but cannot fully trust.
• “9” or “10” very good, for example, someone who you will do your best to help.
(3b) In the past three months, how many times did you or your spouse make personal
contacts with him/her?
a. None b.1-5 times c.6-10 times d. more than 10 times
(4) The wedding is for : a Yourself, b Your son, c Your daughter
(5) Is the wedding ceremony is held in Qingdao? Yes/No
(6) The name of the restaurant is (if you cannot remember the exact name,
please specify “below 3 stars,” “3 stars,” “4 stars” or “5 stars”)
(7) The number of guests (10 years old or above, including the giver herself/himself) the
giver brought to attend the wedding: (if the giver didn’t attend, please write “0”)
(8) The value of the monetary gift is: Yuan
(9) Have you given a monetary gift to the counterpart in wedding or other important
events after you received the gift? Yes/No.
If you choose “Yes,” please answer Question 10-11.
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(10a) Please describe the event where you gave the gift (for example their child’s 100th
day birth celebration, or their daughter’s wedding)
(10b) The event took place in Year
(10c) The monetary gift you gave is Yuan.
If this occasion is a wedding, please answer question 11(a)-11(d)
(11a) The wedding is for : a herself/himself, b her/his son, c her/his daughter
(11b) The name of the restaurant is: (if you cannot remember the exact name,
please specify “below 3 stars,” “3 stars,” “4 stars” or “5 stars”)
(11c) The number of guests (10 years old or above, including yourself) you brought to
attend the wedding dinner is
(11d) Is the wedding ceremony is held in Qingdao? Yes/No
B.1.3 “Giving First + Receiving Later” Gift Record Instructions
You are reading the “Giving First + Receiving Later” gift record instructions, so please write
your answers for each gift to the “Giving First + Receiving Later” forms.
(1a) Please describe the nature of your relationship with the person you gave the gift to:
Relatives, Friends, Classmates, Colleagues, Other
(1b) You first met in Year (You can ignore this question if you are relatives)
(1c) Your counterpart is Male/Female
(1d) Please describe her/his family’s economic situation
a. Very difficult b. Slightly worse than average c. Average d. Slightly better than average
e. Very good
(2) Year of the wedding:
(3a) Please choose a number between 1 and 10 that best describes the quality of your
relationship. (Note: the question asks the relationship quality at the year when you exchange
gift)
• “1” or “2”: very bad, for example, both parties hate each other;
• “3” or “4”: bad, for example, both parties dislike each other;
• “5” or “6”: average, no special feelings;
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• “7” or “8”: good, for example, a friend or relative you care about but cannot fully trust.
• “9” or “10”: very good, for example, someone who you will do your best to help.
(3b) In the past three months, how many times did you or your spouse make personal
contacts with him/her?
a. None b.1-5 times c.6-10 times d. more than 10 times
(4) The wedding is for : a herself/himself, b her/his son, c her/his daughter
(5) Is the wedding ceremony is held in Qingdao? Yes/No
(6) The name of the restaurant is (if you cannot remember the exact name,
please specify “below 3 stars,” “3 stars,” “4 stars” or “5 stars”)
(7) The number of guests (10 years old or above, including the giver herself/himself) you
brought to attend the wedding: (if you didn’t attend, please write “0”)
(8) The value of the monetary gift is: Yuan
(9) Have you received a monetary gift from the counterpart in wedding or other important
events after you gave the initial gift? Yes/No.
If you choose “Yes,” please answer Question 10-11.
(10a) Please describe the event where you received the gift (for example your child’s
100th day birth celebration, or your daughter’s wedding)
(10b) The event took place in Year
(10c) The monetary gift you received is Yuan.
If this occasion is a wedding, please answer question 11(a)-11(d)
(11a) The wedding is for : a yourself, b your son, c your daughter
(11b) The name of the restaurant is: (if you cannot remember the exact name,
please specify “below 3 stars,” “3 stars,” “4 stars” or “5 stars”)
(11c) The number of guests (10 years old or above, including herself/himself) she/he
brought to attend the wedding dinner is
(11d) Is the wedding ceremony is held in Qingdao? Yes/No
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B.2 DEFINITION OF RELATIONSHIP QUALITY USED IN THE
SURVEY
• “1” or “2” very bad, for example, both parties hate each other;
• “3” or “4” bad, for example, both parties dislike each other;
• “5” or “6” average, no special feelings;
• “7” or “8” good, for example, a friend or relative you care about but cannot fully trust.
• “9” or “10” very good, for example, someone who you will do your best to help.
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